Abstract-In the (t, n) threshold signature schemes with the assistance of a trusted party, the trusted party easily becomes the targets of attack. And an authority which can be trusted by all players doesn't exist. So the schemes without a trusted party were proposed to solve those security problems. But all of the conventional schemes without a trusted party cannot withstand conspiracy attacks. A novel (t, n) threshold signature scheme with a weakened trusted party is proposed, in which the group secret key is composed of two parts. Any t or more group players cannot cooperate to reveal the group secret key and the weakened trusted party only knows a part of player's secret key. So the new scheme can effectively withstand conspiracy attacks and as the power of the trusted party is limited, it meets the purpose of designing a threshold signature scheme without a trusted party.
I. INTRODUCTION
The threshold signature scheme is a special kind of group signature scheme and it only allows t or more players to generate a signature on behalf of the group, any less than t players cannot. A secure threshold signature scheme should satisfy the following properties: anyone who just knows the group public key can verify the threshold signature, but he cannot tell who participated in the signature; in case of disputes, the threshold signature can be opened without revealing any secret key in order to tracing the signers, which cannot deny participation in the signature. Since Desmedt and Frankel resented the first (t, n) threshold signature scheme based on the RSA assumption [1] in 1991, more threshold signature schemes and their modifications were proposed [3] [4] [5] . Unfortunately, most of these schemes suffer from the conspiracy attack, which was firstly introduced by Li et al. at the Crypto'93 [2] .
The threshold signature schemes can be classified into two types: with or without a trusted party. Harn presented a threshold signature scheme based on ElGamal signature without a trusted party [3] . However, this scheme cannot resist the conspiracy attack, which means any t or more players can cooperate to reveal the group secret key, then, they can forge a threshold signature. WANG Bin et al. [4] proposed an improved version based on by use of Joint Secret Sharing technique. But it still cannot resist conspiracy attack [5] , even cannot resist forgery attack [6] and signers in the scheme are untraceable [5] . Many improved schemes were proposed, but they have more or less security flaws. Design a truly secure threshold signature scheme without trusted party is still difficult problem. XIE Qi et al. [7] and LIU Hongwei et al. [8] separately proposed their threshold signature schemes with a trusted party. Though these schemes can successfully withstand the conspiracy attack, the trusted party easily becomes the targets of attack and an authority which can be trusted by all players doesn't exist.
To overcome these weaknesses, in this paper, we propose a novel (t, n) threshold signature scheme with a weakened trusted party. In our scheme, the group secret key is divided into two parts. The first part is computed by all of the group players according to secure distributed key generation protocol, and the other part is chose by the weakened trusted party. Because of using this improved method, the conspirators cannot to corporate to reveal the secret keys of group and other players; the trusted party just control partial group secret information, which make the scheme meets the purpose of designing a threshold signature scheme without a trusted party. Moreover, our scheme provides anonymity and traceability simultaneously.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we propose a novel scheme with a weakened trusted party. Then we show the correctness of the proposed scheme and analyze its security in Section III. Finally, conclusions are marked in Section IV.
II. A THRESHOLD SIGNATURE SCHEME WITH A WEA-KENED TRUSTED PARTY
In this section, we will propose our novel scheme and begin with defining the following notations. The notation U={U 1 , U 2 ,…,U n } is defined as the signing group of n players, and US is any subset of size t in U. The notations ID i denoted as the identities of U i . There is a Shared Distribution Center (SDC) which takes the responsibility of the weakened trusted party. Initially, SDC chooses a one-way collision-resistant hash function h (), two large primes p and q, and a generator g of order q over GF(p), where q|(p-1). A. Key and shares generation phase (1) The first part of secret key generation phase
The first part of secret key is generated by all of the group players according to secure distributed key generation protocol. And players execute as follows: 
A R y will be make known to public in the group. In summary, the system parameters are: the group secret key is X; the public information is (p, q, g, h (), Y) ; the player's private secret key is 
B. Threshold signature generation phase
Let m be the message to be signed, and US ={U j1 , U j2 ,…, U jt } be the subset of U with t players who want to sign m on behalf of U. The t players negotiate to elect a player to be the designated clerk (DC), and assume that U j1 is the DC here. 1) Each U ji randomly chooses an integer 2) Then each U ij computes:
and sends the partial signature ) , ( Thus, the group signature is {m, S, R, K}.
C. Threshold signature verification phase
On receiving the threshold signature {m, S, R, K} of message m, the verifier can use group public key (p, q, g, h (), Y) to authenticate the validity of the group signature by the congruence equation:
If the equation holds, the signature is valid.
III. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS

A. Correctness of the scheme
The correctness of the proposed scheme is shown in this paragraph.
(1) The U j can verify 
B. Security Analysis
In this paragraph, we will discuss several possible attacks. None of these attacks can successfully break the proposed scheme.
(1) An adversary tries to forge a partial signature to pass the verification of Eq. (3) or forge a threshold signature to pass the verification of Eq. (4) .
If the adversary tries to forge a partial signature, the most direct way is to reveal the player's private secret If the adversary tries to generate a threshold signature, he needs to get t players' secret keys at least. Obviously, it is impossible. If the adversary just tries to forge a threshold signature to pass the verification of Eq. (4), he needs to know 1 X and 2 X , but both secret parameter is hardly to be revealed from the public information. Thus, this attack cannot work successfully.
(2) Any t or more legal players try to corporate to forge a partial signature or a threshold signature. We know that any t or more players can corporate to reveal all secret information generated by the distributed key generation protocol based on the Lagrange interpolation theorems. However, in our new scheme, the secret key is composed of two parts. The second part is chose randomly by the SDC, and any two players' secret keys have no relation. So any t or more players can corporate to reveal only the first part of player's private key and the first group secret key. And if they want to reveal the second part of player's private key from ) , , (
, they have to solving the DLP. So, any t or more legal players cannot corporate to forge a valid partial signature or threshold signature. Therefore, our scheme can resist conspiracy attack. (3) The trusted party SDC tries to generate a partial signature using the identity of the player.
The SDC just decided the second part of the players' private key, and the first part cannot be revealed by SDC. So, this attack cannot work successfully. (4) Anonymity and traceability.
The verifiers just know the public key and the group threshold signature, and they cannot reveal more but the signature's validity.
In case of disputes, the trusted center SDC or players can trace back to quarry the signers. In the threshold signature {m, S, R, K}, R=R j and t n C subsets of t players has t n C different R j . What's more, it's hard to choosing randomly R to forge a threshold signature to pass the verification of Eq. (4). So, the SDC can find the signers according to R.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel (t, n) threshold signature scheme, in which the group secret key is composed of two parts. The first part of the secret key is computed by all of the group players according to distributed key generation protocol, and the other part is chose by the weakened trusted party. The analysis of security shows that any t or more group players cannot cooperate to reveal the group secret key or another player's private key, so they cannot forge any player's signature, not to mention a valid group signature. Furthermore, the trusted party in this scheme is weakened and it just masters partial group secret key. So, the scheme also achieves the purpose of designing a threshold signature scheme without a trusted party. 
